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FRANS GREGERSEN - SIMO K0PPE 
Zusammenfassung 
Ausgehend von der Gegeniiberstellung der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Naturwissenschaften und 
der Geisteswissenschaften wird argumentiert, dafi Wissenschaftlichkeit nur auf der Basis einer 
Zusammenstellung wissenschaftstheoretischer, wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher und wissenschafts 
soziologischer Kriterien definiert werden kann. Eine solche dreiteilige Definition wird skizziert, 
und es wird behauptet, dafi dies giiltig sowohl fiir die Naturwissenschaften als auch fiir die 
Geisteswissenschaften ist. Es folgt daraus, dafi es im Prinzip keine Verschiedenheit zwischen der 
Wissenschaftlichkeit der einen Basiswissenschaft und der anderen gibt. Die Formulierung dreier 
normativer Kriterien fiir Wissenschaft als solche schliefit den Artikel ab. 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
As researchers in the humanities we have lately been struck by the fact that 
strictly speaking we are impossible. Both to the public mind and to the 
philosopher of science a researcher is either a natural scientist or not at all. The 
interesting thing about this state of affairs is that it does not seem to bother 
anyone. 
Now it might be argued that the recent crisis within philosophy of science is 
precisely concerned with the problem how to prove that there is a difference 
between science and pseudo-science. It has not until now been possible to 
reach an agreement on this socalled demarcation problem. And if we cannot 
show that the natural sciences are scientific, we humanists should not be sorry 
that we do not even qualify as worthy of attention in this respect. 
This argument would, however, be beside the point in one important 
respect, viz. that it presupposes that the average scientist is influenced in his 
view by the philosopher of science. This is even less true for the public at large. 
The public and the average scientist whether he be a natural scientist or a 
humanist scientist all agree that science par excellence is natural science. This 
does not, to be sure, mean that the public think that the disciplines of history, 
psychology and linguistics, to name only some of the more prominent ones, 
are 
uninteresting or less valuable for society, than say chemistry. What it does 
mean is precisely that these disciplines are not scientific, they do not have any 
truth authority.2 
1 The following article is a condensed version of some of the discussions elaborated in our 
book (Gregersen and K.0ppe 1985) about epistemology, history of science and sociology of science 
regarding humanistic science. 
2 
By and large the debate among the philosophers of science concern the natural sciences e. g. 
the implication of nuclear physics in general and quantum mechanics in particular for the specific 
theory of science that is on today's agenda. A note-worthy underlining of this situation can be 
Zeitschrift fiir allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie XX/1 (1989) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart 
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Instead of immediately remediating this deplorable situation we might begin 
to speculate which interests are served by it and thus contribute to uphold it. It 
is a common observation that natural scientists think of humanists as creative 
and artistic3, some of the natural scientists even propose to learn from the 
supposedly more intuitive way that the humanistic scientists create their 
knowledge. Still more common is the accepted myth of the logical natural 
scientist adding observation to observation until he finally reaches the appro 
priate generalization. These images of the typical natural and humanistic scien 
tists are both of them miles apart form any reality, but the important thing is 
that they are miles apart from each others as well. 
The natural scientist may long for the sides of his personality that the public 
thinks he has to suppress while all the way he can in practice use his creative 
talents and necessarily must use his intuition if he wants to produce new and 
daring conjectures or find new ingenious ways of refuting the old ones. The 
only condition is that he does not question the demarcation. Note that ques 
tioning the demarcation means at once questioning the possibility of distingu 
ishing between humanistic and natural science and distinguishing between 
science and non-science, e. g. ideology or religious beliefs. 
For the natural scientist the humanistic sciences are always quarrelling. 
Thomas S. Kuhn4 has acutely termed this continuous struggle for life a pre 
revolutionary stage, thus implying that normal scientists do not quarrel about 
fundamentals. Even if the picture of the humanistic sciences were true -which 
it is not - we would not be so frightened by it as Kuhn was. In fact, as 
Feyerabend has said5, it is the state of normal science which is a mortal illness. 
We shall return to this below, here it should be sufficient to remark that the 
obvious disagreement about fundamentals in the humanistic sciences may be 
used to obscure the wars between different paradigms in the natural sciences. 
And wars there have been. 
The humanists seem content to be regarded as not quite scientific as long as 
they are not called upon to legitimate themselves. In times of crises 
- 
and 
everywhere in Europe that we know of (with the possible exception of the oil 
exporting state of Norway) the humanistic sciences are in a crisis - the human 
ists seem to have recourse not to their being true sciences, but to the ideology 
of romanticism and historicism. We shall argue below that the split between 
the humanistic sciences and the natural sciences was a consequence of the rise 
of ahistoric positivism within the natural sciences and historicist romanticism 
within the humanistic sciences. Nowhere can this descent of the humaniora be 
seen as 
clearly as in the justification that the humanist departments choose to 
seen in Blackwell (1983), a detailed bibliography of the philosophy of science in the period 
1945-1981. Out of a total of 516 pages, 110 or approximately 20% concern special topics in the 
philosophy of the physical sciences, and 35 pages alone concern quantum mechanics. 
3 In the 1986 nobel laureate round table an impressive amount of time was spent on some 
natural scientist preaching the supposed merits of an artistic point of view. Natural scientists often 
confuse art and humanistic science. 
4 T. S. Kuhn (1969). 
5 P. Feyerabend (1970). 
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use. Our experience is naturally limited, but the justifications produced by the 
Danish university departments all of them concern promises of a richer inner 
life for the students (in contradistinction to the technological advances that the 
natural sciences promise) and the preservation of the spiritual values of the 
nation state. The historians and students of the mother tongue join in their 
allegiance to the idea of the nation state. Compared to the hard cash we are 
promised by the sciences it is a tribute to the firm roots of the "Bildung" that it 
is so relatively successful as a pretext for having humanistic departments. 
There is, of course, some truth in the various arguments based upon the idea 
of a close relation between humanistic studies and the socialization agencies 
(see part V below), but it cannot serve as a theory of science for the humanists 
that they have taken over the role of the church. At most it is a more or less 
accurate description of the function of the humanistic sciences. Consequently, 
we now take a closer look at the theory of science that has dominated the scene 
for the last 40 years, viz. the tradition of Popper. The purpose of the inspec 
tion is to see whether there might be themes in this tradition that could help 
towards establishing a normative theory of the humanistic sciences. 
II. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
According to the mainstream of the philosophy of science, you may follow 
one of three strategies in defining scientific exploration. The first is to specify 
the epistemological conditions for obtaining true knowledge, thereby obtain 
ing a logic for scientific discovery. Logical positivism is the primary advocate 
for this view, but it is also emphasized in Popper's critical rationalism. In the 
past 20-25 years a large number of studies in the history of sciences have 
shown that whatever epistemological criteria you choose to use, in fact, there 
have always been successful scientific theories which did not satisfy such epis 
temological criteria for true knowledge.6 The failure of the first strategy gave 
the impetus to a reformulation that emphasized two other strategies 
- the 
historical and the sociological. In spite of great differences between the three 
great philosophers of science of the post-Popperian periode, Kuhn, Lakatos 
and Feyerabend, they all of them agree in choosing the history of science and 
the sociology of science as their point of departure. A theory of science worth 
its name must fit the historical and sociological facts. Kuhn's paradigm as well 
as Lakatosian research programmes are historical concepts, and Paul Fey 
erabend exclusively uses the history of science when proposing his radical 
relativism. Kuhn7, in particular, supports his theory of paradigms by a number 
of sociological theses regarding the sociological mechanism in groups of scien 
tists, their publication channels, seminars, scientific education etc. 
Philosophers of science who use the abovementioned strategies as founda 
tions for defining scientific exploration presuppose, however, results from 
humanistic science. In most cases they do this without noticing it. Their theses 
tacitly imply rather complex theories about the perceiving subject, language, 
6 The locus classicus is by now I. Lakatos (1970). 
7 T. S. Kuhn (1968). 
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history, and society. At the same time, they do not even recognize humanistic 
science as real science - the humanistic disciplines are said not to have reached 
that status yet. When the philosophers of science do underline some of the 
humanistic themes explicitly it is not very convincing. As an example we 
choose Feyerabend. 
In one of his recent books8 Feyerabend tries to defend his radical relativism 
by the socalled principle of incommensurability, which states that not only you 
may not, you cannot compare two competing theories. Feyerabend bases this 
principle among other things on historical-anthropological theories regarding 
the historical development of the way human beings cognize reality, on the 
linguistic Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and on the psychological theories of Jean 
Piaget, in particular his hypothesis regarding the psychological development of 
the child's perception of time and space. It is of course interesting for humanis 
tic scientists that these themes "at last" get into the philosophical discussion of 
natural science, but on the other hand, the specific theories have been chosen 
without the slightest critique and discussion. Every historian knows that the 
way human beings cognize reality more or less is bound to their historical 
epoches, and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is frequently used to intensify the 
interests of the youngest students in humanistic sciences, but, and that is the 
important thing, all the three theories mentioned are debatable and debated 
and not just results, you can pick up without further ado. Actually, modern 
linguistics is based on the principle of translatability of all concepts, a princi 
ple, squarely at odds with the Sapir-Whorf thesis. 
The point we wish to stress here is that you cannot on the one hand discuss 
the basic issues of philosophy of science ignoring humanistic science as sci 
ence, and on the other hand, implicitly or without discussion use very complex 
hypotheses which are the specialties of the humanistic sciences, to construct 
the very theory of science that excludes the humanistic disciplines. 
In our search for a theory of science that includes or specifies the humanistic 
disciplines we find ourselves with a theory of science that is in itself debatable 
and specifically presupposes that our problem has been solved. For if psychol 
ogy is not scientific how could anyone build any theory on it? 
III. HERMENEUTICS 
Having reached this far in our text, some of our friends the philosophers 
might be so irritated as to exclaim "But there is a theory of science especially 
geared to the needs of the humanities, viz. hermeneutics".9 
In this context we only want to discuss some important aspects of her 
meneutic philosophy 
- 
aspects regarding the relations between the human 
subject and history, expecially how it is possible to conceptualize historical 
facts being yourself a historical subject. 
8 P. Feyerabend (1975). 
9 For a general discussion of hermeneutics see P. Ricoeur (1981) and the following references. 
It is 
noteworthy that Kuhn (1977) takes hermeneutics to be the historical-epistemological prin 
ciple. 
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According to the German philosopher W. Dilthey, the human subject is 
born into a specific culture, which determines his or her ways to acknowlege 
the world around him/her. This is also true when we reach out for scientific 
knowledge. Still, Dilthey maintained that it is possible for humanistic scien 
tists to obtain objective knowledge. Dilthey claims that it is necessary to 
develop a historical consciousness by means of which it is possible to identify 
oneself with the tradition, thereby getting to be able to reconstruct the past. 
Historical consciousness is able to transcend the borders which are manifested 
by the specific culture which the scientific subject is immersed in. 
Two other German hermeneutic philosophers 
- M. Heidegger10 and H.-G. 
Gadamer11 have criticized Dilthey precisely because of this view of the pos 
sibilities of objective humanistic knowledge. Heidegger claims that a human 
subject as such exists as being-in-the-world, and that the subject is bound to 
this world. One of the important characteristics of this ontological dimension 
is the socalled preunderstanding. Every one of us has basically and existentially 
an 
acknowledgement of the world we are born into, and it is completely 
impossible to transcend this dimension. Preunderstanding is especially impor 
tant when in a scientific context we are confronted with cultural products and 
other human subjects. 
H.-G. Gadamer has continued the tradition of Heidegger's hermeneutics. 
He underlines the importance of language as the medium in which we are 
bound to formulate our knowledge. Language is a specific cultural product, 
and it is not possible to filter out the historical determinants. This radical 
historicism leaves no room for a scientific process outside the determinants of 
history. 
As far as we can see, if radical historicism is true, then it is true for all 
scientific disciplines, including the natural sciences. If the ontological dimen 
sion of hermeneutics is a primary condition for any subject, it must also 
include the natural scientist. 
The conclusion is that hermeneutics is not able to constitute the foundation 
for humanistic science - either it is the foundation for all science or not a 
foundation at all. 
This conclusion is not in harmony with recent philosophical theories which 
try to incorporate hermeneutics as a special branch for humanistic science. We 
think here of K.-O. Apel12, J. Habermas13 and G. Radnitzky.14 In spite of 
their differences, they all of them postulate that natural science and humanistic 
science are based on different principles, and claim, that the combination of 
these principles in the so called critical sciences is able to transcend the histori 
cal determinants. Our point is different, namely that it is impossible to base 
only humanistic science on hermeneutics, 
- 
either all sciences or none. 
10 M. Heidegger (1962). 
n H.-G. Gadamer (1972). 
12 K.-O. Apel (1967). 
13 J. Habermas (1971). 14 G. Radnitzky (1968). 
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IV. THREE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON SCIENCE AS SUCH 
Our main assumption is, that the only consistent definition of science has to 
include three fields: epistemology, history of science and sociology of science. 
The development in philosophy of science has shown, that it is impossible to 
define science from one of these criteria alone, without getting into serious 
troubles. 
Assuming furthermore that the scientific universe may be divided into three 
basic types of research, natural science, social science and humanistics, it is 
immediately clear that they investigate different types of objects. Regarding 
this object-field of science, we may say, as a first abstraction, that natural 
science explores nature, social science prefers society and humanistic science 
takes as its object the subject as such and its cultural manifestations. 
This generalization is so abstract, that its information value is close to zero. 
As a further generalization we suggest that humanistic sciences are concerned 
with four basic types of objects - the psychological subject, language, history 
and the arts. Every discipline within humanistic science 
- the national 
philologies, literary criticism, etc. ... 
- use hypotheses from the four basic 
humanistic fields of objects, often more than one at a time. 
(a) Epistemology. One of the results of the development within philosophy 
of science is, that you no longer are able to define science purely from an 
epistemological point of view. The last 20-30 years can in this respect be 
labeled "the crisis of epistemology". It is a byproduct of this development 
- 
that is at least our hypothesis 
- that it is no longer possible to draw a clearcut 
epistemological line between humanistic science and natural science. The 
objectivity of natural science and the subjectivity of human science are both of 
them a myth. In all science the choice of measuring-instruments not only 
delimit the field of objects, the instruments also interact with the object, and 
therefore determine the sort of knowledge you get. This interaction functions 
at very different levels, but the principle is the same. The interaction is, how 
ever, partly determined by the degree of reduction of the object. It is slightly 
easier to operationalize a phoneme than the semantics of the word "liberty" 
- 
but it is part of the abovementioned myth, that you can eliminate interaction 
by reducing the object to directly measurable entities. 
Reduction of the object to empirically testable entities is part of every 
science, also the humanistic. You can't explore the psychological subject scien 
tifically if you try to investigate empirically e.g. "personality", "perception", 
"emotion" etc. as unreduced wholes - these are abstract concepts, which need 
reduction and operationalization, which is much the same thing, in order to be 
explorable. The point is, that you have to live with both sides of the problem 
reduction is necessary but the wholeness of the object is the only reality. If you 
lose the object as a whole in the scientific process you are no longer able to 
grasp the interaction between you yourself as a scientific subject and the object 
- 
you are no longer able to see the continutity between the motivated measure 
ment and the object as such. 
Epistemologically, humanistic science, (as all science), is characterized by a 
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reduction of the object to empirically testable entities, the application of cer 
tain specified methods, the interaction between subject and object, and the 
need for reflection of the relations between reduction and wholeness of the 
object. 
(b) History of science. History is relevant in at least two respects - as the 
history of the field of objects itself, and as the history of the reflections on the 
changing reality, in short as the history of science. The history of the field of 
objects is a question of the social character of this field - this will be dealt with 
below. When you want to define human science from the historical viewpoint, 
science is conceptualized as a structure of concepts subordinated to historical 
development. 
The individual discipline within the field of humanistic science is constituted 
as a science at a certain time. This constitution happens as a so called epis 
temological rupture15 characterized by three simultaneous developments. (1) 
The particular field of objects of the individual discipline is established as the 
exclusive zone of interest for that particular discipline. (2) All previous discus 
sions of themes relating to the field of objects are stigmatized as prescientific 
ideologies. From then on a structure of basic concepts which constitute the 
core of the particular science will develop. (3) The investigation of the field of 
objects is qualified by the introduction of certain specific methods. After the 
epistemological rupture, you are not able to choose the methods you like 
- not 
if the results are going to be valued as scientific. 
The characteristics of epistemological rupture do not imply, that science as 
such is non-ideological. They mean, on the other hand, that the relation 
between the scientific results and ideology is of another kind than between 
ideology and the philosophical statements before the rupture. We here need to 
introduce a distinction between latent and manifest ideology, coined by the 
Swedish philosopher Sven-Eric Liedman.16 In accordance with Liedman, we 
will define ideology as a coherent view of nature, human subject and society. 
This coherent view is not a distortion of some authentic, original true world 
view - the point is, that every coherent totality-view of nature, subject and 
society is bound to be ideological. Every meaningful discourse has im- or 
explicitly an ideology. It does not need to be homogeneous, and if it is formu 
lated explicitly, it always concerns but a part of the totality-view. Latent 
ideology is implicit while the partly explicated ideology is termed manifest. 
In accordance with this definition, all scientific products 
- as 
meaningful 
discourse - are based on some latent ideology. Even in the most clearcut 
mathematical treatise you are in principle able to reveal latent ideology, espe 
cially if you see that particular treatise as part of a specific historical tradition. 
You can't 
"get rid of" ideology, only choose to pass it over in silence, or make 
it explicit. 
If humanistic science often is more troubled by internal strife between diffe 
15 L. Althusser made this term, which he borrowed from Gaston Bachelard, famous in his 
lectures on marxism. (Althusser 1969). 
16 S.-E. Liedman (1986). 
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rent schools than natural science, it is not because human science is less scien 
tific, but because the totality-view, in part owing to the practice of humanistic 
science, is more obvious. By "more obvious", we don't mean that facts from 
humanistic sciences are more ideological, than in other sciences, but only, that 
the ideological foundation is more explicit. 
We have emphasized the epistemological dialectics between reduction and 
wholeness of the object. The ideological totality-view is basically a continua 
tion of the passing from reduction to wholeness, 
- 
namely, a passing from 
wholeness to totality. The epistemological reduction of the object, and the 
ideological totalization are two apparently contradictory basic aspects of the 
scientific process, but equally inescapable. The only way out of this problem is 
to 
explicate the ideology, to analyze the relations between reduction and total 
isation. 
(c) Sociology of science. The epistemological rupture has important sociolog 
ical corollaries. (Of course it might be possible to argue that the corollaries are 
causes and vice versa). Corresponding to the creation of a specific obligation to 
explore a certain object, we have the development of chairs at the universities 
and the rise of societies to promote the internal discussion among the new 
professionals. The rise of scientific societies is in its turn intimately linked to 
the development of journals and international congresses and meetings. In 
short what is most aptly described as a process of professionalization is at 
hand. 
The professionalization process means of course that it is now possible to 
earn a living doing precisely what some persons earlier had done for part of 
their time as "amateurs". The founding fathers of the humanistic sciences had a 
rough start some of them precisely because as a rule they had to justify the new 
science as being a logical development of some old and established field of 
research while at the same time explicitly rejecting the established ways of 
conceptualizing the field. Revolutions always have their victims. 
Professionalization presupposes the academy. Institutions like the academy 
function as socializing agencies for the future generation. Thomas S. Kuhn has 
in detail described the process of handing down the gospel: The paradigmatic 
text book becomes a classic and establishes the specific universe of discourse 
that in time will develop into an esoteric code of terms and concepts itself 
functioning as a rite de passage for the newcomers. Sometimes one might 
suspect that what is called theory is just an elaborated system of terminology. 
It is, in fact, not uncommon at the institutionalized rite de passage, the exami 
nations, to meet with students who cannot understand that they did not pass 
the exam. - They knew all the terminology, could use all the correct words, so 
why didn't they pass? And indeed as the institutions grow older and the 
disciplines develop you will not even hear such complaints any longer because 
by now such students will pass! 
The professional academy is a most ingenious and practical solution to the 
demarcation problem. Once you have entered the academy you have entered 
the privileged zone of truth. It will not bother the academy, if no two profes 
sors will agree on anything, the academy is not dogmatic about truth and there 
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are many interesting views worth an academic discussion. Sociologically 
speaking, the demarcation problem was solved when the academy was 
institutionalized. The only discussions which involve practical reasoning on 
scientificity are the appointment discussions and these are internal to the 
academy. 
V. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF THE HUMANISTIC SCIENCES 
After having introduced and discussed the necessity of using simultane 
ously the three ways of defining science as such, we want to take a step 
further by sketching how humanistic science was constituted as a separate 
scientific discipline. 
Certainly the split between the different kinds of scientific disciplines is 
not a natural phenomenon which has been with us forever. It is difficult to 
locate the split precisely in time but one might begin by observing that after 
the speculative period of science called the enlightenment, it was not any 
longer the case that the prominent natural scientists were philosophers as 
well. Of course there have been and there will still be a lot of natural scien 
tists who participitate in discussions on methodology and the theory of sci 
ence but they do so from now on as natural scientists not as polyhistors. It is 
presumably important for the understanding of the process that the split 
occurred as historicism was born. The typical humanistic sciences like history 
(art history, history of literature, history of language), philology and 
philosophy were all deeply affected by the historicism of the 19th century and 
probably the historical nature of the subject matter studied came to create a 
decisive difference between natural and humanistic sciences. The natural sci 
ences study eternal laws, the humanistic sciences study historical phenomena. 
But the historicist tradition does not and cannot now serve as a demarca 
tion device since already in the beginning of this century the swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) distinguished between synchrony and 
diachrony.17 Synchronic studies are systematic studies carried out on simul 
taneously existing units while diachrony consists in historical analysis. And 
historical analysis is itself a series of chronologically ordered synchronical 
analyses of succeeding stages. This distinction is by and large accepted by all 
humanistic sciences thus creating a justification for systematic humanistic 
studies of a non-historicist kind. 
It is a commonplace of the history of science that positivism influenced all 
scientific activity deeply and that the social as well as the humanistic sciences 
tried to justify themselves by aping positivist methodology. Maybe psycho 
logy is the best example of this. It was constituted as a psycho-physics main 
taining a strictly quantifiable methodology. But in 20-30 years both 
psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychology extended the borders for 
psychological science, thereby determining a more complex field of objects 
for scientific psychology, namely the psychological subject. But, as we are 
just going to show, 
- the elements of the field of objects of a specific seien 
17 In chap. 3 of F. de Saussure (1983). See also the discussion in M. Scheerer (1980). 
This content downloaded from 130.226.229.16 on Tue, 10 Feb 2015 11:15:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
A Normative Theory of Humanistic Knowledge 49 
tific discipline are not always easy to locate in relation to the three main 
disciplines. 
First strategy: A definition of the scientific activities based on the subject 
matter of research. 
Consider a science such as psychology. Neuropsychologists study the 
human brain and so do neurologists, but the neurologist is normally seen as a 
natural scientist, the neuropsychologist would not necessarily want to be so 
classified. Or what about all the other branches of psychology that study for 
instance the effect of certain chemical substances on the psyche, the behaviour 
of rats in a laboratory and the simulation of intelligence by means of a compu 
ter. The first one investigates what doctors too would be interested in, the 
second one studies what the zoologist might as well study, and the last one 
overlaps in his interest with the computer scientist. And yet there is an increas 
ing demand for a unified psychology, a conscious effort to fight the fragmenta 
tion into disciplines of what should have been a coherent theory of the human 
being's internal make up. The answer is simple one might say: Either psychol 
ogy is not and can never be a unified science, all efforts notwithstanding, or if 
it is one and a unified science it is not a humanistic science. 
This last option would have to be taken, if it was not possible to carry 
through exactly the same analysis for the other kernel sciences of the humanis 
tic departments: Linguistics has through phonetics and neurolinguistics obvi 
ous connections with the natural sciences and via sociolinguistics and socializa 
tion theory close ties to the social sciences and yet we would want to keep as 
one science the science of language. Obviously, the same is true for archaeol 
ogy and history. The conclusion is: It is not possible to separate the humanistic 
sciences from the two other main disciplines solely based on a scrutiny of the 
subject matter of science. 
The conclusion as it stands is a negative one and it is, we believe, correct. 
Still, it does not preclude a delimitation of what the kernel sciences of the 
humanities take as their favorite point of departure, as their paradigmatic 
subject matter so to speak. As these central concerns for the humanities we 
have proposed the sciences of the subject, of history, and of language. As the 
last area we include aesthetics. There are certain internal connections between 
these four areas: History has 
- because of the central role of historicism in the 
establishment of the humanities - the unique position of being at once the all 
embracing total science of the humanities and a dimension, diachrony, in 
opposition to synchrony. Language plays a role in the formation of the subject 
and is more often than not, in the form of written texts, the very substance of 
history. As for psychology, the theory of the subject that implicitly or 
explicitly guides your research fundamentally shapes the type of history you 
will be able to write. Finally, both the theory of the subject and language (or 
rather the theory of sign systems) are fundamental to any conception of aesthe 
tics, whether this be built on literature or any other sign system. 
Accordingly, we find that this delimination may function as one of the 
building blocks in a definition of what the humanities are as sciences. 
Second strategy: A definition using the history of science. 
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We shall make this short. Obviously philosophy is the oldest of the sciences 
that now consider themselves humanistic.18 Next in line comes philology but it 
was not until historicism that the split between the natural, social and 
humanistic sciences was founded. And the split between the social and the 
humanistic sciences probably was aggravated when the social sciences took the 
natural sciences as their model as mentioned above. 
The discipline of theology plays a special role in the history of the humanis 
tic sciences. If we study the Realgeschichte of the universities, theology was of 
course the professional school in which what would now be called the 
humanities flourished. With the gradual secularization of Europe the 
humanities lost their immediate access to the people but that story is the next 
one to be told. 
Third strategy: A definition using the type of practice the science aims at. 
The practice of the humanistic sciences is, we suggest, the socialization pro 
cess. This makes the line of continuation from the vicars and priests of the 
periods when the church was the strongest ideological apparatus and to the 
highschool teachers and critics of today obvious. 
The special relationship between schooling and the humanistic sciences 
becomes even clearer, when we remember that the cultural techniques of 
writing and reading are essentially humanistic. When the national states of 
Europe emerged and teaching reading began to be at the same time teaching the 
mother tongue, a need arose for the study of the mother tongue as a language 
on a par with latin and greek. The earliest attempts at linguistics were concen 
trated on grammar and only with romanticism do we find the epistemological 
rupture that created a science of language. Romanticism was of course also 
essential in furnishing the national languages of Europe with an ancient litera 
ture thus laying the foundations of the modern philologies. 
Present day humanistic science is only connected with the practice that it has 
grown out of by countless links. But the chain is still there, ultimately the 
humanistic results end up in the schoolroom. 
Fourth strategy: A definition based on the sociology of science. 
Institutionally there seems to be universal agreement among university buil 
ders and planners that there is a difference between the departments of natural 
science and the arts-departments. The modern philologies and the arts seem to 
be the most stable components of the humanistic sciences, while history some 
times fuses with the social sciences and psychology sometimes remains apart. 
The buildings will typically contain immense libraries and a lot of copy machi 
nes or - what is now the equivalent 
- some computers that give access to data 
bases of relevance. On the other hand, there will typically be no laboratories, 
no 
machinery and consequently not the staffs of artisans, machinists and elec 
tricians that e.g. nuclear physics cannot do without. In short, the human 
sciences are thought of and practiced as "soft" qualitative science thereby 
*8 It is in fact arguable whether philosophy is one discipline any more. Philosophy of science 
has tended to develop into a branch of science and ethics and epistemology can perhaps only with 
difficulty be construed as disciplines irrespective of content. 
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entering into a well known opposition that splits the social sciences internally 
while the natural sciences remain preoccupied with hard facts. 
Taken apart neither of the strategies mentioned so far amounts to much but 
taken together and coordinated with the basic concepts from the preceding 
section, we might solve the somewhat artificial problem of defining the human 
sciences: The fields of objects are the arts, language, the subject and history. 
These fields were chosen in the process of founding the humanistic sciences, 
their particular epistemological rupture. The rupture was characterized by the 
thematic polarity between positivistic methodology (especially in psychology) 
at the one end, and historicism (especially in history and the national 
philologies) at the other, which, as we saw, already Saussure criticized with the 
concept of synchrony. Sociologically, the human sciences were upheld by and 
themselves contributed to a professionalization and specialization of the 
ideological socialisation, that resulted from the dissolution of religious Europe 
into secularized nation states with universal education. Psychology, in particu 
lar, functions as the scientific basis for pedagogical practices and the measure 
ment of normality. 
VI. A NORMATIVE BASIS FOR SCIENCE 
If we accept that the picture painted by the prejudiced natural scientist of an 
eternally quarrelling but extremely creative and artistic humaniora is wrong, it 
is only with regret. As mentioned above we share Paul Feyerabend's convic 
tion that the type of science that Thomas S. Kuhn has described as normal 
science is not a sign of sanity but a sign of decay. The particular historical 
period we have entered calls for a new strategy if we want to save truth-finding 
as a social phenomenon. 
The irreversible specialization and the sociological solution of the demarca 
tion problem have both of them removed the need for any scientist to partake 
in the dialogue on fundamentals that is absolutely necessary if the scientific 
community is to guarantee the truth of any particular theory. Instead of a 
continuing discussion across paradigms we see little discussion as such and 
absolutely no discussion between rivalling factions. This must be changed. 
But before we can change it we have to agree on a set of rules by which the 
new game can be played. The demarcation problem is no longer an issue, the 
problem is how to evaluate a work of science. If we can agree on some norms 
for the quality of science we have taken an important step towards opening the 
interparadigmatic discussions. In short, instead of discussing whether a given 
theory is scientific or not, we should discuss whether it qualifies as good 
science or not. 
In the following we suggest three characteristics of good science. Their 
particular realization will presumably reflect the different traditions and 
objects of the disciplines but in principle they should be valid for all kinds of 
science. We note in passing that the current change of scene within some of the 
more 
speculative natural sciences convince us that a parallel development is 
under way there. 
The first characteristic is that good science realizes that its results as well as 
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its concepts are historical phenomena. There is a growing interest in the his 
tory of science but the trend tends to split off the history of science from 
science as such, thus creating a situation where normal scientists can behave as 
if history has stopped. But history is not only the past but also the present and 
the future. In order to make discussions on the verisimilitude of results easier, 
every practising scientist should realize the historical nature of the discipline he 
is working within and the concepts he uses. In practice, this demand would 
take the form that every dissertation was required to sketch the history of the 
problem under investigation. Precise analysis of the historical nature of the 
problem under scrutiny will enable critical discussions to attack the ideological 
stance embodied in the actual research. 
This first characteristic can be seen as a typical internal criterion. The second 
characteristic is typically external to the particular science within which the 
practitioner moves. 
In a preceding section we sketched the necessary reduction the undivided 
material substance of the real world has to go through for it to be scientifically 
manageable. This reduction process is not normally visible as such but the 
characteristic we propose in this connection is that good science reflects upon 
this reduction process and its relation to the totality. 
In practice, this normative demand may take two related forms: First the 
demand may legitimate interdisciplinary search for evidence from other sup 
posedly independent disciplines for one's own insights. This is so, since several 
disciplines actually treat some of the same phenomena and so should at least 
converge in their findings. The other form is that it may lead to reflections on 
the role of the discipline in question in the totality of the scientific endeavour 
to understand the indivisible reality. If reduction is the sine qua non of scien 
tificity simply because we cannot empirically investigate totalities as such, it 
becomes all the more important to realize that the reduction process is in 
principle arbitrary in being precisely a reduction. If we do not fulfill this 
demand we shall be painting simplistic portraits of tiny bits of the real cake and 
the portraits will even be incommensurable in the strict sense of that word. 
The third characteristic of good science that we propose as a norm has to do 
with the relation to practice. Too many scientists have blindly followed what 
they believed to be their private fascination only to awake after the fact to 
discover that they have invented someting dreadful. Everyone will first and 
foremost think of the atomic bomb but we might just as well think of disastr 
ous findings such as the IQ-test or the popular theories of congenital dyslexia. 
Anyone speculating on such topics should be forced to reflect upon what 
consequences their findings would have 
- forced by the norms of the scientific 
community that is. 
As mentioned above every science has a preferred practice which it furnishes 
with substance. Consequently, it should be comparatively easy to establish as 
a norm that it is part of good scientific behaviour to relate one's findings to 
their imagined or real effects. 
The three characteristics may be seen as a code for sound scientific conduct 
but it should be kept in mind that the code loses its raison d'etre if it is not 
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followed by the discussion it was constructed to facilitate. We feel that the 
current situation calls for an intensified effort towards establishing media and 
channels for this interdisciplinary and interparadigmatic discussion. 
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